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Abstract  
Research has followed a network perspective of supply management from as early as the 
publication of Krajlic matrix. This portfolio approach is still static. Recently the triad is 
interpreted as the smallest unit of a network through which dynamics can be studied. Analyzing 
triads seems to be a promising way through which a deeper insight into the dynamics of supplier 
development can be gained. Using case study approach the paper investigates this dynamics 
with a special emphasis on coopetitive behavior. Analyzing a triadic sourcing setting operating 
in a make to engineer (and order) environment we show the importance of governance. 
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 Introduction 
Research has followed a network perspective of supply management from as early as the 
publication of Krajlic matrix (1983) indicating the need for a systemic approach to managing 
suppliers. This so called portfolio approach is still static, since it does not deal with the 
interactions between different buyer-supplier relationships. Recently both practitioners and 
researchers have recognized that relationships may have a significant effect on other 
relationships and suggested the relationship triad as the basic unit of analysis (Wu – Choi, 2005; 
Choi – Wu, 2009). This triad is interpreted as the smallest unit of a network through which 
dynamics can be studied. A triad is made up of three actors (nodes) and the links (relationships) 
that connect them. Since managing the supply base means managing interconnected 
relationships (Roseira et al., 2010), analyzing triads seems to be a promising way through which 
a deeper insight into the dynamics of supply base development can be gained.  Although the 
importance of triads is more and more acknowledged, triadic research is still underdeveloped. 
Näslund and Hulthen (2012) carried out an extensive literature review and found that only 12 
articles applied a triadic approach to supply chain management issues. 
This paper does focus on a specific triad that consists of a focal firm in a buyer position (B) and 
two of its suppliers (S1 and S2). Using case study approach we investigate a specific supply 
chain triad interconnected through a triadic supply strategy. This strategy is interpreted as an 
effective means to merge the benefits of both single and multiple sourcing and create 
coopetition between suppliers of the triad that may serve the long term joint development of all 
the actors (Dubois – Fredriksson, 2008; Gadde – Håkansson, 2008).  
First we shortly summarize on hand knowledge on triadic sourcing strategy. Then our case 
study is introduced and discussed with focus on governing problems. The paper is closed with 
conclusion. 
What do we know about triadic sourcing strategy? - A literature review 
For quite a long time both purchasing managers and academics had the interpretation that long 
term competitive advantage stemming from a supply base requires a conscious segmentation of 
supplier relationships and the way these relationships are managed (Dyer, 1996; Dyer – Singh, 
1998). Byers were be expected to choose between specific relationship types, basically arms’ 
length or strategic relationship. In the first case unit price of the supplied products (or service) 
and the low cost of operating the relationship were interpreted as the basic sources of 
competitive advantage. In the latter case quick adaptation to changing customer’s requirement 
and so an enhanced capability of innovate. But firms have developed innovative supply 
management strategies that do not aim at following traditional competitive strategies of cost 
leadership or differentiation (Porter, 1985) but strive to implement mass customization strategy 
that combines traditional competitive priorities. From a supply base management perspective 
this requires the combination of the two traditional relationship management styles and so 
merge their benefits. Hybrid sourcing strategies are interpreted as an effective means of this 
ambition.  
At the moment three types of such hybrid supply strategies are identified and described in 
literature, the ‘parallel sourcing’ (Richardson, 1993), the ‘network sourcing’ (Hines, 1995, 
1996) and the triadic sourcing strategy (Dubois – Fredriksson, 2008). All hybrid strategies are 
different from the so called dual sourcing. In a dual sourcing situation two independent 
suppliers are used for the same component (Van Weele, 2005). In case of a hybrid supply 
 strategy at least two suppliers are capable of delivering the same component, still the buyer 
applies single sourcing for a specific product. Compared to the other two hybrid sourcing 
strategies, in case of triadic sourcing the byer “actively creates and encourages 
interdependencies between the two suppliers” (Dubois – Fredriksson, 2008, p. 170). In creating 
these interdependencies the buyer has clearly a mediating role that was classified as ‘joining’ 
(Holmen – Pedersen, 2003). This means that the triad has three active, interrelated relationships. 
Not only the two buyer – supplier relationships of the triad are interrelated but there is a direct 
relationship between suppliers too. Using another terminology this constellation is called closed 
triad (Smith – Laage-Hellman, 1992), where all actors interact with each other. 
The Volvo Cars’ case (Dubois – Fredriksson, 2008) is seen as the archetype of triadic sourcing, 
where the buyer creates a creative tension between cooperation and competition through a 
dynamic division of labor between supplier firms. The buyer in his case has a long term 
orientation and commitment to both suppliers. This allows to widen the landscape for 
interaction between buyer and suppliers but also between suppliers. The buyer is the key actor 
that governs the three interrelated relationships in the triad and forces both competition and 
cooperation between suppliers. Competition between suppliers is trigged using several 
situations or events, since suppliers compete for (i) different responsibilities/ activities (product 
development, component sourcing), (ii) different component and modules. At the same time 
suppliers are exposed to cooperation (i) in incremental type of product innovations, (ii) 
coordinating and leaning their material flows towards the buyer, and (iii) supplier base 
development and management.  
The Finnish Company Case developing triads into quadrats – the issue of governance 
According to literature triadic sourcing strategy creates coopetition between suppliers in the 
triad. Therefore supply managers have to overcome the traditional trade-off approach 
suggesting that increased competition is possible only accepting a decrease in cooperation 
between partners. Using case study approach we aim at understanding how this can be achieved, 
what are the core challenges. 
Case study research as a research strategy that aims at understanding the internal dynamics of 
an individual case and is aiming at understanding comprehensive and relevant phenomena of 
real life. The method is especially useful when a researcher cannot control the target. 
Furthermore, it is useful when the focus is on concurrent events in a real time manner especially 
when the border between the event and context is not clear. There are three types of case study 
research: explorative, descriptive, and explanatory research. We apply the desctiptive approach. 
Its aim is to provide as accurate image of a phenomenon as possible. In the research the focus 
is not in clarifying connections between phenomena or factors interpreting behavior, but only 
in describing a situation. The aim of explanatory research is to explain causal relations between 
phenomena and testing related hypotheses (Yin, 2009).  
The focal firm of our triadic case is a Finnish Company (FC) that shows achieving coopetitive 
behavior of suppliers is not easy to achieve, and requires thorough development of governance 
mechanism. The firm of the triad in the buyer’s position (B) is FC operating in Finland. FC is 
engaged in developing mainly tailor made industry products and offers complex services 
globally, and is one of the leaders in the industry. Products are produced engineered to order or 
make to order and there are no warehouse of ready products. Because of high level of 
customization and uniqueness of products both the operation of FC and its suppliers is 
extremely knowledge-intensive. In this respect our case fundamentally differs from the well-
 known Volvo case, where the focal firm is operating in mass customization environment. In 
our triadic setup the batch size is very small, in most of the cases one. The length and the volume 
of one contract that has to be competed for by the suppliers are smaller compared to the Volvo 
case and generally the car industry. The operation is more project based leading to a more 
frequent bidding process and so creating more room for competition and less for cooperation in 
the triad. 
FC has tried to develop a triadic sourcing strategy with Company A and Company B in the 
position of Supplier1 and Supplier2 (S1 and S2). Company A is also located in Finland and 
produces subassemblies for the core product of FC. It is part of the global supply chain, but 
mainly supplies products sold in the European region. Components and raw material are 
purchased mainly from local suppliers as well as component suppliers from Europe. Company 
B is a private company in Slovakia suppling FC partly with the same subassemblies than 
Company A, but also some other products. In these latter case Company A and B are 
independent suppliers. 70% of its total turnover comes from FC in case of Company A. The 
same ratio is 50% in case of Company B. According to a triadic sourcing strategy competition 
is present in the triad. As noted earlier due to the project based operation this competitive 
atmosphere is very strong between suppliers. Still, in order to create long term 
interdependencies among actors and strengthen joint development FC actively tried to create 
cooperative situations between supplier A and B. For example, in case of capacity shortage one 
supplier was expected to help out the other one. Due to the knowledge intensive nature of the 
product and technology this inevitably forced suppliers to share sensitive information and offer 
component supplies. Product knowledge and technology, but also process capabilities are 
consequently partly known to each other in the triad. Although the buyer in our case tried to 
create creative tension between suppliers and build a coopetitive type of relationship described 
by Dubois and Fredrikkson (2008), it was not very effective.  
Raymond Noorda, the former CEO of Nowel Inc. (Branderburger – Nalebuff, 1996) was the 
first to come up with a new type of horizontal and/or vertical relationship, labelled as 
coopetition. Since that several research programs have been carried out in vertical coopetitive 
relationships, such as supply chain relationships developed between buyers and suppliers 
(Dowling et al., 1996; Castaldo et al., 2010 –) Determined by the intensity of cooperation and 
competition between partners Luo (2007) has identified four different situations in a coopetitive 
relationship (see Table 1): contending, isolating, partnering, and adapting situations.  
The original Volvo case has also pointed out that competition and cooperation between 
suppliers in a triad are event based. For example, each time when a new product in the suppliers’ 
portfolio is planned to be developed, competition becomes stronger. On the other hand in times 
of new product launches cooperation in optimizing material flows becomes dominant. These 
events may occur parallel and may have contradictory effects on perceptions of both suppliers. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Relationship situations based on the intensity of cooperation and competition 
between partners (based on Luo, 2007) 
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According to our research results attitudes of suppliers in a triadic supply relationships in a 
project based operation change very intensively over time. Short partnering and contending 
situations forced by the focal firm could have been detected parallel with long isolated periods 
with extreme closed attitude toward the other supplier in the triad. The reluctant attitude of 
suppliers have led to serious performance problems in critical situations, with unexpectedly low 
cost efficient, problems in delivery punctuality, quality and flexibility. These problems raised 
the question of relationship governance and initiated a structural change in the supplier setup. 
The concept of governance is originated in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 
1981). Governance mechanisms are interpreted as safeguards against opportunism that firms 
employ in order to govern their relationships (Jap – Ganesan, 2000; Wang et al., 2008). The 
two formal coordination mechanisms are the market and the hierarchical (or bureaucratic) 
coordination. In case of market coordination the contract is seen as the means of governance; 
while hierarchical coordination uses ownership rights and properties for governing 
relationships. Besides these classic coordination and their aligned governance mechanisms 
Ouchi (1980) has early stressed the importance of a third type of governance, where common 
values and beliefs (e.g. trust) play the crucial role in governing the relationship. Ouchi has called 
this clan coordination, but later own this type of governance was labelled as relational (Medlin 
et al., 2005).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: The initial triad and its governance mechanism (dotted line indicating relational 
while continuous line contract based governance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our case the original triad was formally governed using contracts in two relationships from 
the three, the relationships between the focal firm and its suppliers. Relational characteristics –
such as trust for example– were expected to act as a safeguard between the two suppliers. This 
relational governance mechanism has been proved to be week in enhancing really intensive, 
rich and effective cooperation between suppliers. Therefor the buyer has decided to strengthen 
the governance of the critical supplier-supplier relationship and partly acquired a third supplier, 
Company C in Estonia. This company is a joint venture of the focal firm delivering huge variety 
of subassemblies to focal company. 90% of total turnover of supplier C comes from FC.  
 
Figure 2: The quadratic setup and its governance structure (continuous line indicating contract 
based governance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This third supplier created formally governed relationships with both Company A and B and is 
expected to play the direct mediator between suppliers. The newly developed quadratic setup 
helps the FC govern the indirect relationship between supplier A and B. 
The issue of governance is only an example of management problems in triadic supply strategy. 
The objective of our research is to map in a systemic way the perceptions of the suppliers related 
to both cooperative and competitive situations and see the key management challenges of such 
quadratic supply strategy. These perceptions may help us understand the dynamics in supply 
network and describe management challenges, prerequisites, and key characteristics of network 
supply in a more sophisticated way. 
FC 
B A 
FC 
A B C 
 Conclusion  
Many scholars have researched supplier management and supplier development. This paper 
presents a core management situation related to manage and develop suppliers in a triadic 
setting. Triadic approach is unique and there are not too many publications with empirical 
evidence. In triadic sourcing the byer “actively creates and encourages interdependencies 
between the two suppliers”.  
The empirical case study states that utilizing triadic sourcing strategy could create competitive 
advantage for the focal company. The resented case study is unique, where the focal company 
is sourcing engineer to order and make to order products from its supply partners. For case 
products focal company has developed triadic sourcing approach where three suppliers are 
developed utilizing supplier development concept. Focal company’s role to develop suppliers 
is extremely important: they are facilitators to develop suppliers and invest resources for 
development activities. 
The issue of governance is only an example of management problems in triadic supply strategy. 
The objective of this research is to see the key management challenges of such quadratic supply 
strategy.  
Our preliminary results indicate that there is a reasonable gap in understanding triadic supplier 
settings, their functioning in different operational strategies, core management limitations and 
challenges. The literature in this field is more focused to theory development and that’s why 
empirical case studies are needed to show more empirical evidence on triadic sourcing.  
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